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I study a version of the Lagos-Wright (2003) model of monetary exchange in which buyers have
private information about their tastes and sellers make take-it-or-leave-it-offers (i.e., have the
power to set prices and quantities). The introduction of imperfect information makes the existence
of monetary equilibrium a more robust feature of the environment. In general, the model has a
monetary steady state in which only a proportion of the agents hold money. Agents who do not
hold money cannot participate in trade in the decentralized market. The proportion of agents
holding money is endogenous and depends (negatively) on the level of expected inflation. As in
Lagos and Wright's model, in equilibrium there is a positive welfare cost of expected inflation,
but the origins of this cost are very different.
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Lagos and Wright (2003) develop a search-theoretic model of money that is suitable for studying
issues related to monetary policy and inﬂation. In previous contributions to this literature, the
divisibility of money was diﬃcult to handle because the models usually generated complicated
dynamics of the distribution of money holdings. To avoid this problem, most of the work was
done assuming indivisibility of money and limits on the amount of money that agents could carry.
While this assumption increases the tractability of the models, it renders them unsuitable for
the study of inﬂation. The paper of Lagos and Wright breaks with this trend in the literature
by proposing an alternative set of assumptions.1 In particular, they assume that agents can
hold any positive amount of divisible money, but they introduce a subperiod to the model where
agents can trade, in a centralized market, goods for which they have quasilinear preferences.
This new combination of assumptions makes the distribution of money holdings (endogenously)
degenerate and hence makes policy analysis tractable. One crucial feature of the Lagos-Wright
model is that in the interesting cases of the possible (steady state) monetary equilibria, the buyer
in the decentralized market, when matched with an appropriate seller, must have some bargaining
power that allows her to obtain a positive surplus from the match. When this is the case, the
share of the surplus obtained by the buyer is positively associated with her money holdings and
this extra payoﬀ provides the incentives necessary for a positive demand for money even when,
purely as an asset, money would have an insuﬃcient real rate of return.
This feature of the Lagos-Wright model is shared with the previous money-search literature. In
particular, if sellers have the power to propose prices and quantities and buyers can only decide
whether or not to trade, most search models of money do not have a monetary equilibrium (see
Curtis and Wright, 2003). This result follows from the fact that, by the time trading takes place,
the buyer cannot adjust its money holdings and hence the sellers can extract all the surplus from
trade. This is an instance of the classic hold-up problem in contract theory. One possibility to
get away from the hold-up problem is to assume that sellers can commit to post prices ex ante
and buyers can choose which market-post to attend. This is the strategy taken, for example, in
Rocheteau and Wright (2004). An alternative possibility is to modify the information structure of
the model. In particular, the ability of the seller to extract all the surplus from a match is a direct
consequence of the fact that sellers have perfect information about the buyers’ willingness to pay.
More realistic information assumptions have been used in the literature, but again tractability
1There are other modiﬁcations of the standard model that have been used to deal with this problem. For
example, Shi (1997). See Lagos and Wright (2003) for a discussion of the diﬀerent approaches.
2limited results. In this paper I show that the Lagos-Wright framework can be use to study
realistic information structures that bring new l i g h ti nt h en a t u r eo fm o n e t a r ye x c h a n g ea n dt h e
consequences of monetary policy.
My model is in many aspects very similar to that of Lagos and Wright (2003). The only
important diﬀerence is in the treatment of the decentralized market activity. First, I assume
that agents are ex ante heterogeneous with respect to their preferences for the goods that are
being traded in that market: some agents are more likely to ﬁnd the goods sold to them by a
random seller very appealing. In other words, some agents tend to like the goods available in
the decentralized market more than others. Second, upon entering a match, the buyer receives a
preference shock that determines how much she actually likes the particular good being oﬀered
in that match.2 This shock is private information to the buyer and creates an additional level
of (ex post) heterogeneity among agents. The ex ante heterogeneity is related to the likelihood
of receiving a “favorable” preference shock after entering a match. Ex post, once agents are in
a match, some will ﬁnd out that they like the good being oﬀered to them in the speciﬁcm a t c h
very much. In that case, the agent obtains a positive surplus from the match in equilibrium.
The third feature of my model that diﬀers from the Lagos-Wright environment is that the seller
has all the bargaining power in the decentralized market. Even though this is the case, the
combination of ex post heterogeneity and private information makes a subgroup of the agents
willing to hold money. Agents who are more likely to have a high marginal utility for the good
sold in the decentralized market will carry positive money balances. Due to the existence of
private information, they will then be able to extract a positive surplus whenever they enter a
suitable match by using their holdings of money.
I show that there exists a monetary equilibrium where a proportion of the agents will hold
a positive amount of money. Yet, as in Lagos and Wright’s model, the distribution of money
holdings will be very simple and easy to track in equilibrium. In particular, the distribution only
has two mass points (zero and a positive number).3 More interestingly, not only is the positive
mass-point endogenous (the intensive margin), but also the mass that the distribution puts in
each point will depend on equilibrium outcomes (the extensive margin).4 For example, the level
2This is the kind of preference shocks used by Curtis and Wright (2003) to study (ex ante) price posting in
the Trejos and Wright (1995) environment. Faig and Jerez (2003) study price posting under private information
in Shi’s (1997) environment. However, they use a central clearing mechanism to settle payments and hence no
monetary issues arise in their analysis.
3Purely general equilibrium forces eliminate any price dispersion and all agents with money hold exactly the
same amount and pay the same prices. This feature of the equilibrium signiﬁcantly increases tractability and
stands in contrast with some of the results in Curtis and Wright (2003).
4There are other papers using the Lagos-Wright approach that incorporate extensive margin eﬀects. Rocheteau
and Wright (2004) assume that α, the probability of getting matched in the decentralized market, is a function
3of expected inﬂation in the economy will determine the proportion of agents that participate as
potential buyers in the decentralized market and the amount of money that those agents take to
that market. Since higher inﬂation rates discourage the use of money, fewer agents will decide
to carry money to the decentralized market and even those that do will be able to buy lower
quantities of the goods. These two factors create an endogenous welfare cost of inﬂation in the
model that is associated with diﬀerent factors than those studied in Lagos and Wright (2003).5
This paper achieves two main objectives. First, it provides a tractable analysis of the trade-
frictions-based model of monetary exchange when there is private information about the willing-
ness to pay by buyers. In this respect, it shows that inﬂation can result in welfare costs to society
by reducing the participation of agents in those trades that are typically conducted through mon-
etary exchange. Second, the paper shows that the existence of a monetary equilibrium in this
kind of model is a more robust feature than suggested by the previous literature. In particular,
under private information monetary exchanges still take place even if the sellers have all the
power to set prices and quantities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the description of the environment,
characterizes the monetary equilibrium in the model, and discusses the eﬀects of positive expected
inﬂation on equilibrium outcomes. Section 3 provides some quantitative estimates of the welfare
cost of inﬂation in the model and section 4 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
The model is a modiﬁed version of that in Lagos and Wright (2003). Time is discrete and there
is a continuum of inﬁnitely lived agents with unit mass. Agents discount the future according to
the discount factor β ∈ (0,1). Each period is divided into two subperiods.
In the ﬁrst subperiod, agents interact in a decentralized market where trade is anonymous and
agents get matched in pairs. There are three possible situations in a particular meeting: either
agent j likes the goods that agent k can produce, or agent k likes the goods that agent j can
produce; or neither of the agents like what the other can produce. Each of the two possibilities
for a single coincidence of wants meeting happens with probability σ and the lack of coincidence
of wants happens with probability (1−2σ).I fa g e n tj likes what agent k can produce, I will call
j the (potential) buyer and k the seller. The buyer’s utility is given by εiu(q),w h e r eq is the
of the number of participants in that market (see also Lagos and Rocheteau (2003)). The model in this paper,
however, assumes a ﬁxed value of α.
5Faig and Jerez (2003) study directed (competitive) search in Shi’s (1997) environment when buyers have private
information about their willingness to pay for goods. They use a central clearing mechanism to settle payments
and hence no monetary issues arise in their analysis.
4quantity consumed and εi ∈ {ε1,ε2},w i t hε1 > ε2. The seller’s cost of production is given by
c(q) where q is the quantity produced. The value of εi is speciﬁc to the match and it is private
information to the buyer.6 I will call agents with preference parameter εi in a particular match
as agents subtype i,w i t hi =1 ,2. Agents are also heterogeneous with respect to the probability
of being subtype i. I will say that an agent is of type ξ if, upon entering a match as a buyer,
the probability of her preferences being ε1u(q) is equal to ξ ∈ [0,1]. Types are also private
information. Let Γ(ξ) be the distribution of agents across diﬀerent types.
In the second subperiod, agents interact in a centralized market and produce and consume a
“general” good. Let U(X) be the utility from consuming a quantity X of the general good. These
goods can be produced one-to-one with labor, from which agents experience linear disutility.
I maintain the technical assumptions from Lagos and Wright (2003). That is, u, c, and U are
twice continuously diﬀerentiable, u(0) = c(0) = 0,u 0 > 0,c 0 > 0,u 00 < 0,c 00 ≥ 0, there exists
q∗
i ∈ (0,∞) such that εiu0(q∗
i )=c0(q∗
i ) for i =1 ,2, U0 > 0,U 00 ≤ 0, and there exist X∗ ∈ (0,∞)
such that U0(X∗)=1and U(X∗) >X ∗.
Finally, in this environment there is also an intrinsically useless, perfectly divisible and storable
asset that will be called money. The stock of money in period t =0 ,1,...is given by Mt.
2.1. The Sellers’ Problem
Upon entering a match, the buyer becomes one of the two possible subtypes. Then the seller
makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the buyer, without knowing the buyer’s subtype.7 The seller
may want to choose a set of quantities and prices that voluntarily “separate” the two subtypes,
that is, to set two price-quantity pairs such that a buyer chooses to buy one quantity at the given
price if she is subtype 1 and the other quantity at the other price if she is subtype 2.8 Hence,
6Williamson and Wright (1994) ﬁrst studied some of the potential eﬀects of private information in a random
matching model of money. Their environment is, however, very diﬀerent than mine. They study an economy where
there is no problem of absence of double coincidence of wants. Agents may choose to use money to facilitate trade
because there is private information about the quality of the goods being traded. In contrast, in the model in this
paper money is useful to circumvent an absence of double coincidence of wants problem, like in the traditional
random matching models of money.
7Here we are assuming that the seller can observe the amount of money that the buyer has. Equivalently, if
the seller cannot observe money holdings but can ask the buyer how much money she has before εi is realized,
then the buyer will have no incentives to lie and money holdings will be revealed. Before the realization of εi the
buyer is essentially in the same position as when money holdings were chosen. Hence, instead of lying the agent
would choose to carry less money as long as carrying money is costly due to the inﬂation tax.
8Camera and Delacroix (2004) study a random matching non-monetary economy with private information over
valuations of traded goods. Goods are indivisible in their model and there is only one good per match. This rules
out any nonlinear pricing scheme like the ones studied here. However, under one of the trading mechanism studied
by Camera and Delacroix, the seller separates diﬀerent-type buyers by making a combination of sequential oﬀers.
T h is p ossibility is n ot studied here.
5the seller’s oﬀer is a price schedule {(q1,d 1),(q2,d 2)},w h e r eqi is the quantity oﬀered and di the
monetary payment required to buy that quantity.
To determine his best oﬀer, the seller needs to have an estimate of the likelihood that the
particular agent he is matched with is of subtype 1 or 2.L e tp =P r[ εi = ε1] be such an estimate.
In an equilibrium, this probability p is endogenous and could be a function of the amount of money
m that the buyer carries into the match. In this subsection we will solve the seller’s problem for
all arbitrary combinations of p and m. An equilibrium of the complete model is characterized
in the next subsection. Given p and m, the seller chooses a price schedule to maximize his
expected surplus from the match. This problem is similar to a standard private information
problem where the seller chooses prices and quantities to maximize expected surplus subject
to the buyer’s participation constraints and incentive compatibility constraints (see Maskin and
Riley, 1984). There is, however, one important diﬀerence. The buyer enters the match with a
given quantity of money balances m and hence the seller can only demand from the buyer a
monetary payment that is at most that amount. Both buyers and sellers take as given the value
of money in the economy, φ. The seller’s problem is then,9
max
(q1,q2,d1,d2)
p[−c(q1)+φd1]+( 1− p)[−c(q2)+φd2] (1)
subject to
q1,q 2 ≥ 0,d 1 ≤ m, d2 ≤ m,
ε1u(q1) − φd1 ≥ 0, ε2u(q2) − φd2 ≥ 0,
ε1u(q1) − φd1 ≥ ε1u(q2) − φd2,
ε2u(q2) − φd2 ≥ ε2u(q1) − φd1.
The ﬁrst set of constraints are associated with feasibility. The second line of constraints are
the participation constraints for the subtype 1 and 2 buyer, and the last two constraints are the
incentive compatibility constraints for the subtype 1 and subtype 2 buyer, respectively.
9The payoﬀ functions are a result of the environment. In subsection 2.2 it will become clear why in this
environment the payoﬀ for sellers and buyers in a match is linear in money balances which all agents value the
same.
6Lemma 2.1. The solution to problem (1) satisﬁes:
(1) ε1u(q1) − φd1 ≥ 0,
(2) ε1u(q1) − φd1 = ε1u(q2) − φd2,
(3) ε2u(q2) − φd2 =0 , and
(4) d1 ≥ d2,q 1 ≥ q2.
These results are standard in the private information literature. The ﬁrst result in the lemma
tells us that subtype 2 agents will get zero surplus from trade. If this would not be the case,
the seller could sell a smaller quantity at the same price while still having the subtype 2 agent
participating in the trade. This move would clearly increase the seller’s surplus. Using the ﬁrst
result and the incentive compatibility constraints we obtain the second result, which tells us that
subtype 1 agents obtain a positive surplus from trade. The third result says that the incentive
compatibility condition for subtype 1 agents must be binding in the solution to the problem.
Otherwise the seller could increase his expected payoﬀ without violating any of the constraint in
the problem. Finally, the last result tells us that subtype 1 agents will be oﬀered a quantity that
is at least as big as that being oﬀered to subtype 2 agents.
Let zi = φdi and z = φm. Then, using the lemma, we can rewrite the seller’s problem as
follows:
maxp[−c(q1)+z1]+( 1− p)[−c(q2)+ε2u(q2)] (2)
subject to
ε2u(q2) ≤ z1 ≤ z, q1 ≥ q2 ≥ 0,
ε1u(q1) − z1 =( ε1 − ε2)u(q2),
ε2u(q1) − z1 ≤ 0.
I characterize the solution to this problem in three stages. First, I study the case when money
holdings are not binding (zi <z ,for i =1 ,2); then when money holdings are binding but agent
subtype 1 buys more quantity of the good than agent subtype 2;a n dﬁnally, when both agents
buy the same amount of the good being oﬀered in the match (see Figure 1).
7Figure 1
Deﬁne (b q1, b q2,b z1) as the solution of problem (2) when we ignore the constraint z1 ≤ z. Note
that this solution is not a function of z. Then, there exist values of z such that b z1 ≤ z and the
solution to the seller’s problem is indeed (b q1, b q2,b z1).10
Lemma 2.2. The solution (b q1, b q2,b z1) to problem (2) when the money holdings constraint is
non-binding is given by







b z1 = ε2u(b q2)+ε1 (u(b q1) − u(b q2)).
Recall that q∗
i is such that εiu0(q∗
i )=c0(q∗
i ), for i =1 ,2.N o t et h a ts i n c e1 − pε1
ε2 < 1 − p we
have that b q2 <q ∗
2 <q ∗
1 = b q1. Also note that we can express this solution as a function of p,
which will be determined in equilibrium. Deﬁne S1 ≡ ε1u(q1) − z1 as the surplus of subtype 1
agents. Then, we have the following important result:
10Assume that pε1 < ε2 so that b q2 > 0. This condition needs to be checked in equilibrium and if not satisﬁed
then b q2 w o u l db ez e r oi ne q u i l i b r i u m .
8Lemma 2.3. If b z1 ≤ z then the equilibrium surplus S1 is only a function of p (and not a














where b z2 = ε2u(b q2) is the real balances paid by subtype 2 agents to buy the quantity b q2.
Suppose now that b z1 >zso that (b q1, b q2,b z1) is no longer the solution to the seller’s problem. In
particular, subtype 1 agents will spend all their money in the trade. However, subtype 2 agents
may or may not spend all their money in the trade. Consider ﬁrst the cases when they do not.
L e tu sc a l lt h i ss o l u t i o n(q1,q2,z1,z2) (see the dashed curve in Figure 1). Then, we have that
z2 < z1 = z.F r o mt h eﬁrst order conditions of problem (2) we have that (q1,q2) must then solve
the following system of equations:
f(q2,p)ε1u0(q1)=pc0(q1)
ε1u(q1) − z =( ε1 − ε2)u(q2)
q1 ≥ q2
where f(q2,p) ≡ (1 − p)[ε2u0(q2) − c0(q2)]/(ε1 − ε2)u0(q2). Note that f is decreasing in q2 and
decreasing in p for q2 <q ∗
2. Also note that (b q1, b q2) solve this system of equations when z = b z1.
Then we have the following result:
Lemma 2.4. When z2 < z1 = z<b z1, the solution to problem (2), (q1,q2,z1), is a function of
p and z and satisﬁes:
(1) b q2(p) ≤ q2(z,p) <q ∗
2,











The surplus obtained by subtype 1 agents is now not only a function of p but also a function
of z. In particular, it follows directly from the previous lemma that:
9Corollary 2.1. The trade surplus of subtype 1 buyers is S1(z,p) ≥ S1(p), with equality when







We can now deﬁne z as the value of real balances such that z2(z,p)=z,w h e r ez2(z,p) ≡






It is clear then that q(p) <q ∗
2 <q ∗
1. For any value of z ≤ z the solution to problem (2) has
z1 = z2 = z and q1 = q2 = q(z) where q(z) satisﬁes
ε2u(q(z)) − z =0 ,
Finally note that z is decreasing in p and that, for all z ≤ z, the surplus from trade obtained by
subtype 1 agents is a linear, increasing function of z (see Figure 2). The following proposition
summarizes the previous ﬁndings.
Proposition 2.1. Given a probability p that the buyer will be subtype 1 and an amount of
real balances z with which the buyer enters the match, the surplus for a buyer that turns out to
be subtype 2 is zero and the surplus for a buyer that turns out to be subtype 1 is:
S1(z,p)=

   
   
ε1−ε2
ε2 z if z ≤ z(p),
(ε1 − ε2)u(q2(z,p)) if z(p) <z<b z1(p),
(ε1 − ε2)u(b q2(p)) if b z1(p) <z .
(3)
With this surplus function describing the outcome in a prototypical match, we are now ready
to study a (monetary) equilibrium of the overall economy.
2.2. Monetary Equilibrium
To describe a monetary equilibrium we start by studying the problem of an agent ξ that enters
the decentralized market with z units of real balances and takes as given the seller’s beliefs p(z),
the equilibrium distribution of (real) money holdings F(e z), a n dt h ev a l u eo fm o n e yφ.L e tVξ(z,s)
be the value function for an agent ξ in such a situation, where the state of the economy is given
10Figure 2
by s =( p(z),F(e z),φ).A l s o d e ﬁne Wξ(z,s) to be the value function for an agent entering the
centralized market with z units of real balances in state s. Notice that the amount of goods
traded in a match does not depend on the real money holdings of the seller. Then, we have that:
Vξ(z,s)=σ{Eξ (εiu[qi(z,p(z))] + Wξ [z − zi(z,p(z)),s])} +
σ
Z
Ep(e z) (−c[qi(e z,p(e z))] + Wξ [z + zi(e z,p(e z)),s])dF(e z)+
(1 − 2σ)Wξ (z,s),
where Eξ denotes the expectation over εi,i=1 ,2, for the probability distribution with parameter
ξ (= Pr[εi = ε1]),a n dEp(e z) is the expectation over εi for the probability distribution with
parameter p(e z). Also, we have that:
Wξ(z,s)=m a x{U(X) − H + βVξ(z+1,s +1)}
subject to




and an equilibrium law of motion for s that is taken as given by the individual. From this
expression for Wξ it is easy to see that in equilibrium X = X∗, z+1 does not depend on z,a n d
Wξ is linear in z. Recall here that X∗ is such that U0(X∗)=1 .
We know from the previous section that agents with a low preference for the good in a particular
match (i.e., agents with εi = ε2) get zero surplus from that match.11 Hence, we can rewrite the
11One possibility would be for the seller to try to separate the diﬀerent types ξ by oﬀering some surplus to the
agent with εi = ε2. This contract would tend to attract agents with lower ξ, that is those with a higher probability
11Figure 3
value function Vξ(z,s) as follows:
Vξ(z,s)=σξS1(z,p(z)) + v(s)+z +m a x
z+1
{−π+1z+1 + βVξ(z+1,s +1)},
where v(s)=U(X∗) − X∗ + σ
R
Ep(e z) (−c[qi(e z,p(e z))] + zi(e z,p(e z)))dF(e z) and π+1 = φ/φ+1 is
the (gross) rate of inﬂation. Because the optimal choice of z+2 does not depend on z+1,w ec a n
ﬁnd the optimal value of z+1 by solving the following problem:
max
z+1
{−π+1z+1 + βz+1 + βσξS1(z+1,p +1(z+1))}. (4)
This is an economy with asymmetric information and we use the standard sequential equi-
librium concept to identify possible outcomes. In particular, the next proposition shows that
p(z)=p (independent of z) is a set of beliefs consistent with a (robust) sequential equilibrium.
Now, when p+1 is independent of z+1 in problem (4) the surplus function S1(z+1,p +1) is given
by expression (3) and the solution is either z(p+1) o rz e r o( s e eF i g u r e3 ) .
We know that in any monetary equilibrium π+1 ≥ β (see Lagos and Wright (2003), Lemma
3). Let ξ










of having εi = ε2. H o w e v e r ,t h i st y p eo fs c h e m ew o u l dr e q u i r es o m ec o m m i t m e n tb yt h es e l l e r . U p o ne n t e r i n g
the match, after revealing the value of z carried by the buyer, the seller’s optimal contract is to give zero surplus
to those agents with εi = ε2.
12Then, agents with ξ ≥ ξ
s(π+1) choose real balances z+1 = z(p+1) and agents with ξ < ξ
s(π+1)
choose z+1 =0 . For this reason, the equilibrium distribution of money holdings F has only two
mass-points, z(p+1) and 0,a n dϕ =1− Γ(ξ
s) is the mass of agents holding positive real money
balances. For simplicity, assume that the distribution of types is uniform; that is, assume that Γ
is a uniform distribution with support (0,1). Then, conditional on meeting someone with money,
the seller meets a subtype 1 agent with probability p+1, which is computed using Bayes’ rule and

















The following proposition fully characterizes this equilibrium.
Proposition 2.2. As e q u e n c e{ξ
s
t,p t,q t,z t(ξ),φt}∞
t=0 satisfying the following equations de-
scribes a monetary (sequential) perfect foresight equilibrium for this economy:




















qt = q(pt) for all ξ ≥ ξ
s
t, and
φt = zt(1 − ξ
s
t−1)/Mt,
where πt+1 = φt/φt+1 and ξ
s
t ∈ [0,1] for all t.
It is interesting to note here that even though the general problem for the seller allows for
diﬀerent prices and quantities to be oﬀered with the objective of “separating” the subtypes of
buyers, in equilibrium only one combination of price and quantity is oﬀered and observed.12
Also note that Bayesian updating on the equilibrium path determines a relevant restriction
on the equilibrium belief function p(z)=p. For this reason there is a rational expectations
element to this deﬁnition of equilibrium. Given the predicted inﬂation rate, agents anticipate
that next-period sellers will use pt+1 as their estimate of the probability of facing a buyer with
ε = ε1. Knowing this, agents with ξ > ξ
s
t decide to hold z(pt+1) real balances to use in the de-
centralized market next period (this is the amount of real balances that allows them to maximize
their expected surplus from an eventual match given that the sellers will be using pt+1 as their
estimated probability of ε1). Then, the expectations over pt+1 are fulﬁl l e da sl o n ga st h ea c t u a l





13pt+1 equals (1 + ξ
s
t)/2, a function of the expected pt+1. Similarly, actual inﬂation φt/φt+1 is a
function of expected inﬂation (through the equilibrium determination of ξ
s
t)a n dt h e ys h o u l db e
equalized in equilibrium.
Consider now the case when Mt = M for all t. In this case, for a large enough value of ε1,t h e r e






















SS = ε2u(qSS)(1 − ξ
SS)/M.
It is then straightforward to obtain the following comparative statics results:
















The lemma shows that less frictions in the decentralized market (i.e., high values of σ)r e s u l t
in a steady state monetary equilibrium where (i) a higher proportion of agents hold money; (ii)
it is less likely for a seller who has met a potential buyer to be facing a subtype 1 buyer; (iii)
t h eq u a n t i t i e st r a d e di nag i v e nm a t c ha r eh i g h e r ; 13 and (iv) the value of money is higher (or in
other words, the price level is lower). The comparative statics with respect to β are the same.
Obviously, in this equilibrium money is neutral since qSS and ξ
SS do not depend on M.
Consider, for example, the case of M0 = kM, then we have that in equilibrium
M0φ




0 =( 1 /k)φ
SS. However, we show in the next subsection that in this economy money
is not superneutral.
13This happens because when search frictions increase, agents decide to take to the decentralized market lower
individual money holdings (∂zSS/∂σ > 0). Once the agent enters the match with lower money holdings it is
optimal for the seller to oﬀer lower quantities. Agents carry lower money holdings anticipating that the seller will
increase his estimate of the conditional probability of facing a subtype 1 agent (as less people participate in the
market). If the agent were to carry the same amount of money as before, the seller would oﬀer a higher quantity,
b u ta tah i g h e rp r i c e( s ot h a tt h ee x t r ab e n e ﬁt from the trade is not enough to compensate for the cost of holding
those extra units of money) and would lower the surplus obtained by the agent if she happens to have ε = ε1.
142.3. Changes in the Money Supply
Suppose now that the money supply is growing at a constant rate τ. Since in equilibrium
not all agents hold money when they enter the decentralized market, we assume that monetary
injections take place while agents are still in the centralized market.14 In this way, money gets
redistributed among agents so that only those with high values of ξ exit the centralized market
with money.
We consider an equilibrium with a constant inﬂation rate; that is, φt/φt+1 = π for all t.
Since the quantities traded are also constant, it is easy to show that in a monetary equilibrium











a n df o rah i g he n o u g hi n ﬂa t i o nr a t ew eh a v et h a tξτ is greater than unity, no agent chooses to
hold money, and there is no monetary equilibrium. Then, using Proposition (2.2) we obtain the
following lemma:












The lemma tells us that in economies with higher levels of inﬂation, (i) fewer agents hold
money, (ii) it is more likely for a seller who has found a potential buyer to be facing a subtype
1 buyer, and (iii) the quantities traded in a given match are lower.
Since the quantities produced and traded in the centralized market do not change with inﬂation,
it is clear that higher levels of inﬂation imply lower equilibrium welfare. This is the case for two
reasons. First, in economies with higher inﬂation fewer agents hold money in the decentralized
market, decreasing the number of matches where trade takes place (the extensive margin eﬀect).
Second, even in those matches where trade does take place, since each agent holds less money in
equilibrium, the quantities traded in a given match are lower and the beneﬁtf r o mt h em a t c hi s
reduced (the intensive margin eﬀect).
Let us deﬁne the real interest rate in this economy as r and the nominal interest rate as
i. Then, we have that in equilibrium 1+r =1 /β and 1+i = π/β. T h eo p t i m a lp o l i c yi n
14Lagos and Wright (2003) assume that the monetary injections happen after agents leave the centralized
markets.
15this economy is to set the nominal interest rate i as low as possible, eventually to zero, as in
the Friedman Rule. At that level, the threshold ξτ equals zero and all agents hold money.15
Then, we have that the equilibrium quantities traded are given by q(1/2) <q ∗
1,a w a yf r o mt h e
constrained optimum. This is an important feature of the present model that contrasts with the
standard cash-in-advance model where the Friedman rule implements the social optimum.16
3. THE WELFARE COST OF INFLATION
In this section I use the model to provide some rough estimates of the welfare cost of inﬂation
based on data for the US economy. In the calibration of parameter values, to facilitate compar-
isons, I follow as close as possible the strategy in Lagos and Wright (2003). Normalize ε1 =1
and ε2 = ε < 1. The utility function for goods in the centralized market is U(X)=B log(X) and
that for goods in the decentralized market is u(q)=
£
(q + b)1−η − b1−η¤
/(1 − η).A l s o a s s u m e
















and real money demand is L(i)=εu(q(i))(1 − ξ(i)). Total output per period, Y (i),i st h e
sum of the equilibrium output in the centralized market, B, and in the decentralized market,
σ(1 −ξ(i))q(i). We consider the case when b ≈ 0 and hence we have four free parameters: B, σ,
ε,a n dη.
Using annual data for the nominal interest rate on commercial paper and the ratio of M1 to
nominal GDP, we choose parameter values so as to minimize the sum of square errors between
the observed levels of the money demand and tho s ep r e d i c t e db yt h em o d e l .F i g u r e4s h o w st h e
result for the 1900 − 2003 sample.
15The Friedman rule eliminates the ineﬃciency in the extensive margin but cannot eliminate the ineﬃciency
in the intensive margin. At the time of choosing money holdings the agent anticipates the seller’s incentive to
hold-up and, as a response, carries less money. For a set of related results, see Rocheteau and Wright (2004).
16When ε1 = ε2, there are a continuum of steady states monetary equilibria under the Friedman Rule. This
feature is shared with the cash-in-advance economy (see Woodford, 1994, Proposition 1). However, since the buyer
h a sn oi n c e n t i v e st oc a r r ya n ys p e c i ﬁc amount of real balances, it is still possible that the equilibrium would be
ineﬃcient, i.e., q<q ∗.
17We maintain the assumption that agents’ types are uniformly distributed. Alternative assumptions about
this distribution could help to ﬁt the data better. We keep the uniform distribution assumption for the sake of
parsimony.


















The model produces a reasonable ﬁt. In the data there appears to be a lower bound in the level
of monetization that the model seems to miss (especially at relatively high interest rates). Note
that in the model, a suﬃciently high, yet possibly observable, interest rate would make ξ
s =1and
hence drive the demand for money to zero, something that seems at odds with the data.18 Aside
from this shortcoming, there is another important limitation of this kind of exercise. Speciﬁcally,
the statistical relationship between money demand, output, and interest rates in the US has been
quite unstable over the years (see, for example, Goldfeld and Sichel, 1990). Clearly, innovations
like credit cards and other alternative means of payments have contributed signiﬁcantly to this
instability. Figure 5 shows that the model systematically underestimates the demand for money
early in the sample period and systematically overestimates it late in the period.19
The estimated parameter values are not very precisely identiﬁed. The ﬁgures were constructed
with the set of parameter values that best ﬁt the data. However, there are several diﬀerent
combinations of parameter values that produce essentially the same ﬁt. Diﬀerent parameter
values imply diﬀerent welfare costs of inﬂation. For this reason, I provide the welfare calculations
18One could modify the model to introduce a very high third value of ε,s a yε3, and some agents with high
probability of obtaining such a high level of utility from a match. In that case, these agents would be very
reluctant to hold no money, even at relatively high interest rates. This modiﬁcation can produce a lower bound
in the aggregate demand of money for all potentially observable interest rates which would help the model to ﬁt
the data in Figure 4 better.
19The model generates large shorter-term ﬂuctuations than those observed in the data. This is a standard
feature on this kind of exercise. See Lucas (2000) for a discussion.




















for the ﬁve combination of parameter values that produce the best ﬁt of the data (all of them
with an associated coeﬃcient of determination diﬀering in less than 0.001 from the others, see
Table 1).20
Table 1
Parameters η B σεR2
1 0.289 0.089 0.289 0.467 0.4734
2 0.311 0.044 0.178 0.356 0.4734
3 0.267 0.111 0.378 0.533 0.4732
4 0.267 0.133 0.400 0.556 0.4728
5 0.400 0.156 0.156 0.356 0.4725
In equilibrium, all agents receive a real money transfer T = τφtMt = τ(1 − ξ(i))z(i) upon
entering the centralized market. The equilibrium value for an agent of type ξ ≥ ξ(i) of being in
the decentralized market at the start of the day (when the steady state nominal interest rate is
i)i sg i v e nb y :
(1 − β)Vξ(i)=σξS1(i) − ξ(i)τz(i)+v(i), (5)
20The search was done with a grid of size 44 for each parameter in the interval [0,1]. The value of B does not
have to be in the interval [0,1] but unrestricted searches show that to ﬁt the data B has to be small (and certainly
smaller than 1). For reference, the R2 for a standard linear OLS regression was 0.4455.
18where v(i)=U(X∗) − X∗ + σ(1 − ξ(i))[−q(i)+εu(q(i))], X∗ = B,a n dS1(i)=( 1− ε)u(q(i)).
The second term in the right side of expression (5) is the cost (net of the money transfer)





z(i)=z(i)+τ(1 − ξ(i))z(i) − (1 + τ)z(i)=−ξ(i)τz(i).
Agents with ξ < ξ(i) obtain only v(i)+T. To compute the steady state welfare cost of inﬂation
I use the average value of V across types ξ:
(1 − β)Ω(i) ≡
Z ξ(i)
0




Note that inﬂation has a redistributive eﬀect (agents not holding money get a positive net trans-
fer).21 However, due to the linearity properties of preferences, this redistribution has no real






Deﬁne now the following alternative measure of welfare where the quantities consumed at the
zero-interest-rate equilibrium are multiplied by the fraction ∆F:




Then, I use as a proxy for the welfare cost of inﬂation the value of 1 − ∆i
F,w h e r e∆i
F is such
that Ω∆i
F(0) = Ω(i). We can interpret this value as the amount of consumption agents would be
willing to give up to have the nominal interest rate equal zero (the Friedman rule), rather than
i. Similarly, I compute 1 − ∆i
0, the amount of consumption agents would be willing to give to
move from an economy with nominal interest rate equal to i to one with 3% nominal interest rate
(that is, zero inﬂation). For the calculations, I will use as the benchmark values of i the average
level of the nominal interest rate during the period, i =0 .04, and a higher value, i =0 .13, which
corresponds to a steady state inﬂation of 10%. Table 2 show the values of 1 − ∆i
F and 1 − ∆i
0
for the ﬁve diﬀerent combination of parameters presented in Table 1.
Table 2 also shows the equilibrium values of the proportion of output traded in the decentralized
market, χ(i), and the average mark-up, µ(i), which can be calculated using the following two
21One alternative strategy that avoids redistribution is to assume that newly printed money is (lump-sum)
transferred only to those agents holding the existing balances. This is the standard approach in overlapping
generations models of money (see for example Wallace, 1980). In any case, redistribution is inconsequential
for the issues of interest in this paper. For a version of the Lagos-Wright framework where this redistribution










The value of µ(i) is the weighted average of the ratio of price over marginal cost in the centralized
market (equal to one) and in the decentralized market. The equilibrium values of χ(i) and µ(i)
give us a sense of how reasonable the parameters are and also are helpful for comparison with the
ﬁndings in Lagos and Wright (2003). For example, the value of the equilibrium mark-up tends
to be relatively low compared with the value 1.1 usually used in calibration.
Table 2
Param. µ(0.04) χ(0.04) 1 − ∆0.04
F 1 − ∆0.04
0 µ(0.13) χ(0.13) 1 − ∆0.13
F 1 − ∆0.13
0
1 1.045 0.033 0.025 0.011 1.019 0.009 0.073 0.061
2 1.029 0.018 0.022 0.009 1.012 0.004 0.064 0.052
3 1.055 0.047 0.028 0.013 1.022 0.012 0.082 0.068
4 1.057 0.050 0.029 0.013 1.023 0.013 0.084 0.071
5 1.028 0.014 0.018 0.008 1.012 0.003 0.055 0.046
Note also that the welfare cost of inﬂation and the mark-up are positively associated with the
size of the decentralized sector. The model ﬁts the data best when the decentralized sector is
relatively small (less than 5% of the economy) at the nominal interest rate of 4%. However, in
the Lagos-Wright model the size of the decentralized market at 10% inﬂation, χ(0.13), is around
5%, which is much larger that the numbers in Table 2 (around 1%).
Overall, the welfare cost of inﬂation implied by the model in this paper is relatively high
(comparing with, for example, Lucas, 2000) but the numbers are in the range of those obtained
by Lagos and Wright (2003) in their calibration. The main diﬀerence in terms of calibration
is that in the Lagos-Wright model the bargaining power of buyers is a free parameter. In my
model, sellers have all the bargaining power but the diﬀerence in willingness to pay among buyers
(indexed by ε) is a free parameter. In the Lagos-Wright model, the welfare cost of inﬂation is
higher the lower the bargaining power of buyers (that is, the higher the hold-up problem). When
buyers and sellers have the same bargaining power (which implies an average mark-up equal to
1.04)t h e ye s t i m a t e1 − ∆0.13
F to be 0.041 and 1 − ∆0.13
0 =0 .032. When the bargaining power is
calibrated to generate a mark-up equal to 1.1, the bargaining power of buyers decreases to 35%
and the welfare cost estimates increase to 0.068 and 0.046, respectively.
20Rocheteau and Wright (2003) further study the quantitative implications of the Lagos-Wright
model by introducing an extensive margin eﬀect based on the ability of agents to choose whether
to be buyers or sellers in the decentralized market. Again, the bargaining power of the buyers is
a key parameter in the calibrations and the existence of an extensive margin tends to increase
the welfare cost of inﬂation. In particular, for the lowest level of the buyer’s bargaining power
that they report (20%), the welfare cost estimates are 1 − ∆0.13
F =0 .101 and 1 − ∆0.13
0 =0 .074.
In general, the welfare cost estimates presented in Table 2 are well within the range of estimates
that result from the original Lagos-Wright framework. This makes sense. The assumption in this
paper is that sellers have all the bargaining power, which would tend to increase sellers’ hold-up
power and the welfare cost of inﬂation. However, the presence of private information limits that
ability of sellers to exercise hold-up power over buyers and the combination of those two opposing
eﬀects brings the welfare estimates to be very close to the ones reported by Lagos and Wright
(2003).
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The economy studied in this paper reduces to the one in Lagos and Wright (2003) when
ε1 = ε2. However, since we are assuming that sellers have all the bargaining power, no monetary
equilibria with positive nominal interest rates exists in that economy. The reason for this is that
the seller can exercise, in full, his hold-up power, depriving the potential buyer of any incentive
to carry money into the match. When this is the case, there is no trade (nor consumption)
in the decentralized market. The seller would want to commit not to extract all the surplus
from future matches to provide incentives for the potential buyer to hold money. However, this
commitment is not available to the seller and due to his own ability to extract too much surplus
from a potential match, the seller is left with no surplus at all (because to generate any surplus
the buyer must be holding some money).
Introducing imperfect information (the case of ε1 6= ε2 in this paper) limits the ability of the
seller to extract surplus from the buyer and hence provides the necessary incentives for the buyer
to carry money into the decentralized market. This modiﬁcation, in turn, translates into some
trading in that market and an increase in welfare.
It is clear that one could combine imperfect information with more ﬂexible bargaining rules
(like those studied in Lagos and Wright, 2003). To the extent that uncertainty on the buyers’
willingness to pay is a realistic feature, this may be an attractive strategy to follow. In this
paper, I have shown that aside from being realistic and tractable, imperfect information makes
existence of monetary equilibrium a more robust feature of the environment.
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22Appendix 1: Proofs
This appendix provides all the proof for the lemmas and propositions in the paper.
Lemma 2.1: The solution to problem (1) satisﬁes:
(1) ε1u(q1) − φd1 > 0,
(2) ε1u(q1) − φd1 = ε1u(q2) − φd2,
(3) ε2u(q2) − φd2 =0 , and
(4) q1 ≥ q2,d 1 ≥ d2.
Proof: (1) Combining the inequalities in the constraints of the problem we get ε1u(q1)−φd1 ≥
ε1u(q2)−φd2 ≥ ε2u(q2)−φd2 ≥ 0; (2) To prove that this equality holds in the solution, suppose
it does not, that is, suppose that ε1u(q1) − φd1 > ε1u(q2) − φd2. Then, the seller, by choosing
a smaller q1, will increase the value of his objective function and still satisfy all the constraints.
In particular, ε1u(q1) − φd1 > ε1u(q2) − φd2 ≥ 0 we know that for small decreases in q1 the
participation constraint of subtype 1 buyers will still be satisﬁed. Also, the incentive constraint
for subtype 1 will still be satisﬁed and the incentive constraint of subtype 2 will actually be
relaxed. Hence, a lower q1 is feasible and it is better for the seller. Hence the incentive constraint
of a subtype 1 agent must be binding in the solution; (3) To prove that the participation constraint
of subtype 2 agents must be binding in the solution, suppose not. Suppose the solution has
ε2u(q2) − φd2 > 0. Then, the seller could oﬀer an alternative contract decreasing q1 and q2 to,
say q0
1 and q0
2, and hence increase the value of his objective function. If q0
1 and q0
2 are suﬃciently
close to the initial q1 and q2 then the participation constraints would still hold (since under the
hypothesis being tested both hold with strict inequality for the initial quantities). Furthermore,
if q1 and q2 are reduced in a manner such that the equality in point (2) of the lemma still holds
then we have that ε2 [u(q0
1) − u(q0
2)] < ε1 [u(q0
1) − u(q0
2)] = φ(d1 − d2) which implies that the
incentive constraint for agents subtype 2 still holds. In other words, reducing the quantities sold
to q0
1 and q0
2 is feasible and better for the seller, which shows that the initial q1 and q2 could
not be the solution of the problem; (4) Plugging the equality in point (2) of the lemma in the
incentive constraint of subtype 2 agents we get that (ε1 − ε2)u(q1) ≥ (ε1 − ε2)u(q2) and hence
q1 ≥ q2. Point (2) then implies that d1 ≥ d2 holds.
Remark: When the solution has q1 >q 2 it must hold that ε2u(q1) − φd1 < 0. To see this,
plug the equality in point (2) of the lemma into the equality of point (3) and sum and subtract
ε2u(q1). Then, we get ε2u(q1) − φd1 +( ε1 − ε2)[u(q1) − u(q2)] = 0 which implies that if q1 >q 2
then ε2u(q1) − φd1 < 0 must hold.
23Lemma 2.2: The solution (b q1, b q2,b z1) to problem (2) when the money holdings constraint is
non-binding is given by







b z1 = ε2u(b q2)+ε1 (u(b q1) − u(b q2)).
Proof: Assume the incentive constraint for agent subtype 2 is nonbinding. Then, the ﬁrst
order conditions are:
q1 : p[−c0(q1)+ε1u0(q1)] = 0,
q2 : −p(ε1 − ε2)u0(q2)+( 1− p)[−c0(q2)+ε2u0(q2)] = 0.
Reorganizing these expressions we get the ﬁrst two conditions in the lemma. The third condition
results from combining points (2) and (3) of the previous lemma. Finally, since 1 −pε1
ε2 < 1 −p,
we have that b q2 <q ∗
2 <q ∗
1 = b q1 and from the remark above it follows that the incentive constraint
for agent subtype 2 is indeed not binding.
Lemma 2.3: If b z1 ≤ z then the equilibrium surplus S1 is only a function of p (and not a




Proof: Expression (A1) deﬁnes an implicit function b q2(p). It is then easy to check that b q2 is




(ε2 − ε1 − pε1)u0(b q2)







Using the third equality in Lemma 2.2 we have that S1(p)=( ε1 − ε2)u(b q2(p)). Hence:
dS1(p)
dp




Remark: The other endogenous variables’ comparative statics with respect to p are:
db z1
dp











Lemma 2.4: When z2 < z1 = z<b z1, the solution to problem (2), (q1,q2,z1,z2), is a function
of p and z and satisﬁes:
(1) b q2(p) ≤ q2(z,p) <q ∗
2,











Proof: From the ﬁrst order conditions of problem (2) we have that (q1,q2) must solve the
following system of equations:
f(q2,p)ε1u0(q1)=pc0(q1)
ε1u(q1) − z =( ε1 − ε2)u(q2)
q1 ≥ q2
where f(q2,p) ≡ (1−p)[ε2u0(q2)−c0(q2)]/(ε1−ε2)u0(q2).S i n c ef r o mt h eﬁrst equation f(q2,p)=
pc0(q1)/ε1u0(q1) > 0 we have that by the deﬁnition of f(q2,p) i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tε2u0(q2)−
c0(q2) > 0 which in turn implies that q2(z,p) <q ∗
2 must hold. From the ﬁrst order conditions, and
speciﬁcally the complimentary slackness condition for z1 ≤ z,w eh a v et h a tw h e nt h i sc o n s t r a i n t
is binding f(q2,p) <p . Hence q1 <q ∗
1. Also, since f(b q2,p)=p and f is decreasing in q2 it holds
that b q2 ≤ q2. To proof point (3) of the lemma deﬁne the following two functions
G(q1,q2,p)=f(q2,p)ε1u0(q1) − pc0(q1) ≡ 0,
H(q1,q2,z)=ε1u(q1) − z − (ε1 − ε2)u(q2) ≡ 0.
Also let Gi and Hi be the partial derivatives of the functions G and H with respect to the ith
























25Corollary 2.1: The surplus from trade of subtype 1 buyers is S1(z,p) ≥ S1(p), with equality






















Since q2 ≥ b q2 and S1(z,p) is increasing in q2 (and equal to S1(p) when q2 = b q2)w eh a v et h a t
S1(z,p) ≥ S1(p).
Remark: We deﬁned z as the value of z below which the subtype 2 agents are cash constrained.
Since when z = z the cash constraint is just binding we still have that G(q1,q2,p)=0when
z = z.W e k n o w t h a t f o r v a l u e s o f z ≤ z the subtype 1 agents also spend all of their money.
Hence, we have that z1 = z2 = z. But then, it must be that q1 = q2 = q.D e ﬁne q to be the






W ec a nt h e nu s eq to obtain the value of z since it must be the case that z = ε2u(q). Since it
is clear from the equation above that q is a decreasing function of p,t h e nz is also a decreasing
function of p.
Proposition 2.2: As e q u e n c e{ξ
s
t,p t,q t,z t(ξ),φt}∞
t=0 satisfying the following equations de-
scribes a monetary (sequential) perfect foresight equilibrium for this economy:




















qt = q(pt)for all ξ ≥ ξ
s
t,and
φt = z(pt)(1 − ξ
s
t−1)/Mt,
where πt+1 = φt/φt+1 and ξ
s
t ∈ [0,1] for all t.
26Proof: The essential part of the proof is to show that the proposed beliefs sustain a sequential
equilibrium. I will also show that such beliefs satisfy reasonable criteria in the oﬀ-equilibrium
path. Since the focus is on the intra-period equilibrium, I will drop the time index to simplify
notation. Start with the following conjectured beliefs: p(z)=p∗ for all z. These beliefs justify the
behavior of the seller on and oﬀ the equilibrium path such that the implied surplus function for
the buyer is given by expression (3). Then, all agents with ξ ≥ ξ
s will choose z(ξ)=z(p∗) and all
agents with ξ < ξ
s will choose z(ξ)=0 . The concept of sequential equilibrium does not impose
any restriction on beliefs p(z) for all oﬀ-equilibrium actions z 6= z(p∗).F o rz = z(p∗) however,






s)/2. Then, the belief p(z)=p∗ =( 1+ξ
s)/2 for all z will sustain a sequential
equilibrium.
Next, I show that these beliefs are also reasonable in oﬀ-equilibrium situations (see, for example,
Cho and Kreps, 1987). First consider deviations for the agents holding no real balances in
equilibrium. Since for all ξ < ξ
s the following inequality holds:











t hen n one of these a ge nts will consider d eviating to p ositive real balan ces, r egardless o f th e
beliefs of the seller.
Now consider the case of deviations by agents with ξ ≥ ξ
s. Let us start with deviations to
values of real balances that are lower than the equilibrium level; that is, z<z(p∗). Note that
for all ξ ≥ ξ
s we have that −(π − β)z + βσξS1(z,p) ≤− (π − β)z(p∗)+βσξS1(z(p∗),p ∗) for all
z ≤ z(p∗) and all p.T os e et h i s ,n o t et h a t


















= −(π − β)z + βσξS1(z,p).
Then, no agent with ξ ≥ ξ
s will consider lowering her real balances. In other words, this potential
d e v i a t i o ni sn o tr e l e v a n tn om a t t e rw h a tt h eo ﬀ-equilibrium beliefs of the seller are.
Now consider the case of deviations to higher values of z;t h a ti s ,z>z(p∗).I f p(z) >p ∗
then S1(z,p(z)) ≤ S1(z,p∗) ≤ S1
¡
z(p∗),p ∗¢
and no agent would pursue this deviation (carrying
27additional units of money is costly and does not produce any extra surplus). If p(z) <p ∗, things
are more complicated. In particular, the surplus may or may not increase. Assume it does
(otherwise, the same logic as before tells us that no agent follows that deviation). Furthermore,
assume that
−(π − β)z + βσξS1(z,p(z)) > −(π − β)z(p∗)+βσξS1
¡
z(p∗),p ∗¢
for some type ξ. Then, there exists ξ such that the inequality holds for all ξ > ξ. It is easy to
see that ξ must be greater than or equal to ξ
s. This is because
−(π − β)z + βσξ








=0 . Then, there are two possibilities: (1) If ξ = ξ
s then
any agent with ξ > ξ
s would want to deviate to the higher value of z. In this case, reasonable
beliefs would have p(z)=p∗ which contradicts the starting hypothesis p(z) <p ∗.( 2 )I fξ > ξ
s
then only those buyers with ξ > ξ would want to deviate. But then the belief p(z) should be even
higher than p∗ since only agents with relatively high values of ξ (and, in particular, strictly higher
than ξ
s) will be the potential deviators. This again is a contradiction. Finally, we could consider
more complicated oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs that could potentially justify a deviation. Suppose, for
example, that there are several diﬀerent values of z>z(p∗) that agents could consider deviating
to. In this case, if some values of z attract specially those agents that have ξ close to ξ
s,i tc o u l d
be reasonable to assign to those values of z ab e l i e fp(z) lower than p∗. However, for this to
make sense, there must be another value of z>z(p∗) that attracts agents with high ξ. Then, for
such a value of z, it must be the case that reasonable beliefs satisfy p(z) >p ∗ w h i c hi nt u r nt e l l
us that those agents would not be willing to take such a deviation. In fact, a similar argument
shows that there is no sequential equilibrium with complete sorting of types ξ.
Remark: There is no equilibrium with complete sorting of types ξ for ξ ≥ ξ
s.T o s e e t h i s ,
take an arbitrary belief function p(z). The surplus for a buyer with εi = ε1 is now given by












Note that if dS1/dz > 0 then dS1/dp =0and d2S1/(dz)2 =0 . Also if dS1/dp < 0 then dS1/dz < 0
(Note that dS1/dp is never positive). For any belief function there exists a level of real money
holdings zU such that for all z>z U we have that S(z) is constant independent of z (in fact, we
know that zU ≤ ε1u(q∗
1)).
28Then the agent’s real money holdings are given by the solution to the following problem
max
z∈[0,zU]
−(π − β)z + βσξS(z). (A2)
Let z∗(ξ) be the solution to problem (A2). For a complete sorting of types to be an equilibrium
the surplus function S(z) must be increasing and strictly concave. Note then that z∗(ξ) would
be increasing. But in equilibrium it should be the case that p(z∗(ξ)) = ξ. Then, the only belief
functions consistent with equilibrium are those that have dp/dz > 0. But for S(z) to be strictly
concave it must be that dS1/dz < 0 and hence dS/dz < 0 which contradicts the requirement
that S(z) be increasing. Note that the key to this logic lies in the fact that we require that the
belief function satisfy p(z∗(ξ)) = ξ, which is Bayes’ rule in the conjectured equilibrium path.












Proof: Note that for a monetary equilibrium to exist it must be the case that ξτ < 1. This
condition determines an upper bound on the values of τ that are compatible with monetary equi-
librium. For values of τ below this upper bound, we have that in a constant-inﬂation monetary
equilibria ξ
s
t and pt are constants. Hence
φtMt = z(p)(1 − ξ
s)=φt+1Mt+1 = φt+1(1+ τ)Mt,
which implies that πt = φt/φt+1 =( 1+τ) for all t. Then, the set of constant-inﬂation monetary
equilibria is described by the following set of equations:
ξτ =
ε2

















The comparative statics with respect to τ are straightforward.
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